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This  paper  examines  the  incidence  of  several  taxes  in  a  macroeconomic  model.  Producers  and 
consumers  optimize  with  perfect  foresight.  Price  inertia  leads  to  rationing  in  the  market  for 
goods  and  for  labour.  In  the  long  run  the  system  tends  towards  Walrasian  equilibrium. 
Meanwhile  there  may  be  Keynesian  Unemployment,  Classical  Unemployment  or  Repressed 
Inflation,  with  possible  switches  of  regimes.  Balanced  budget  policies  are  analysed  by  working 
through  numerical  examples. 
1.  Introduction 
Macroeconomic  models  are  complex  if  a  number  of  aspects  are  studied 
simultaneously.  In  general  such  models  can  only  be  solved  numerically.  The 
present  paper  aims  at  an  analysis  of  tax  incidence  in  a  rather  complicated 
model.  Our  approach  builds  on  a  seminal  article  by  Blanchard  and  Sachs 
(1982),  which  integrates  modern  disequilibrium  analysis  with  the  theory  of 
intertemporal  choice  under  perfect  foresight  of  economic  agents. 
Ignoring  minor  differences  the  BS  model  is  extended  in  two  directions.  In 
the  first  place  account  is  taken  of  labour  scarcity,  which  allows  for  the 
regime  of  ‘Repressed  Inflation’,  following  the  terminology  of  Malinvaud 
(1977).  This  regime  was  eliminated  for  the  benefit  of  simplicity  in  the  BS 
model  by  assuming  that  firms  can  always  get  the  amount  of  labour  they 
want.  In  the  experiments  considered  by  Blanchard  and  Sachs,  ‘Repressed 
Inflation’  does  not  matter.  However,  it  can  be  shown  easily  that  the  latter 
regime  may  be  of  importance  if  the  shocks  analysed  by  Blanchard  and  Sachs 
are  reversed.  In  fact,  the  behaviour  of  the  model  is  strongly  asymmetrical. 
In  the  second  place  we  consider  labour  supply  as  an  endogenous  variable. 
Households  are  supposed  to  determine  the  amount  of  leisure  they  want  at 
any  moment.  As  observed  among  others  by  Barro  (1984),  there  seems  to  be 
no  substantial  structural  change  in  the  average  number  of  hours  worked  in 
some  industrialized  countries.  This  can  be  explained  by  substitution  and 
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wealth  effects  cancelling  each  other.  In  an  analysis  of  tax  incidence,  substi- 
tution  effects  come  to  the  foreground  if  wealth  effects  are  eliminated  by 
compensating  measures.  It  may  therefore  be  worthwhile  to  assume  that  the 
supply  of  labour  is  endogenous. 
As  stressed  by  Atkinson  and  Stiglitz  (1980)  in  analysing  the  impact  of 
taxation,  the  basis  for  comparison  is  of  critical  importance,  and  the  problem 
can  be  posed  in  several  ways.  Here  we  follow  Abel  and  Blanchard  (1983)  and 
again  Blanchard  and  Sachs  (1982)  by  assuming  balanced  budget  operations 
with  lump-sum  rebates  or  taxes  as  compensating  instruments.  It  should  be 
remarked  at  the  outset  that  we  are  not  concerned  with  the  problem  of 
optimal  taxation  over  time  as  studied  by  Barro  (1979)  and  Kremers  (1984).  It 
is  obvious  that  in  the  case  when  the  government  wants  to  maximize  the 
utility  of  its  citizens,  all  taxes  should  be  lump-sum.  In  practice  there  exists  a 
number  of  other  instruments  such  as  a  tax  on  profits,  a  sales  tax,  a  wage  tax 
or  investment  tax  credits.  We  shall  analyse  the  incidence  of  these  taxes 
applying  lump-sum  payments  as  an  analytical  instrument  only. 
The  paper  is  organized  as  follows.  In  section  2  the  model  used  in  the 
simulations  is  derived  by  analysing  the  intertemporal  behaviour  of  rational 
producers  and  consumers.  We  mainly  highlight  the  differences  with  the  BS 
model.  A  more  elaborate  presentation  can  be  found  in  Van  de  Klundert  and 
Peters  (1984).  There  are  subsections  on  the  behaviour  of  firms,  the  behaviour 
of  households  and  market  clearing.  The  incidence  of  the  taxes  mentioned 
above  is  discussed  in  section  3.  The  numerical  results  are  obtained  by  the 
method  of  multiple  shooting,  as  explained  in  Lipton,  Poterba,  Sachs  and 
Summers  (1982)  and  Mattheij  (1982).  The  model  specification  and  parameter 
values  applied  are  presented  in  an  appendix. 
The  long-run  equilibrium  in  our  model  is  Walrasian,  as  will  be  shown. 
This  makes  it  possible  to  compare  our  long-run  results  with  the  outcomes  of 
flex-price  models,  as  for  instance  those  of  Abel  and  Blanchard  (1983)  and 
Barro  ( 1984). 
2.  The  model 
2.1.  The  behaviour  offirms 
There  are  two  factors  of  production,  capital  k  and  labour  1. The  tech- 
nology  of  the  representative  firm  is  characterized  by  a  neoclassical  produc- 
tion  function  with  constant  returns  of  scale: 
Y =S(k 4.  (2.1.1) 
Installation  costs  are  introduced  to  derive  a  well-behaved  investment  func- 
tion  along  the  lines  set  out  in  Abel  (1978)  and  Hayashi  (1982).  The  method  is Th.  van de  Klundert  and P.  Petus,  Tax  incidence  39 
standard  by  now.  To  invest  an  amount  of  i  goods,  installation  costs  in  the 
amount  of  ih(i/k)  are  required  (h’ > 0).  The  opportunity  costs  of  investment 
are  therefore  equal  to 
j = i( 1 + h(i/k)).  (2.1.2) 
Denote  by  z,,rY  and  zj  a  proportional  tax  rate  on  profits,  a  proportional 
tax  rate  on  output  and  a  proportional  rate  of  an  investment  tax  credit.  The 
present  value  of  the  cash  flow  of  firms  can  then  be  defined  as 
1  JI 
-(1-z.)j  Ptdt,  (2.1.3) 
where  W stands  for  the  wage  rate  and  P  for  the  price  of  output.  The  discount 
factor  p =exp  ( -fors  ds)  gives  the  rate  at  which  output  at  time  t  can  be 
traded  for  output  at  time  zero.  Firms  take  the  time  paths  of  wages,  prices 
and  interest  rates  as  given.  In  addition,  there  is  the  possibility  that  the 
amount  of  goods  they  can  sell  is  restricted:  ysy,  or  that  the  amount  of 
investment  goods  they  can  buy  has  an  upper  bound:  is  t(and  j5  7).  If  firms 
are  not  rationed  in  the  output  market,  firms  may  be  confronted  with  a 
constraint  on  the  amount  of  labour  they  can  hire:  151’  It  should  be  noted 
that  the  values  of  the  endogenous  variables  at  which  the  constraints  become 
binding  are  themselves  endogenous  to  the  model,  though  from  the  point  of 
view  of individual  agents  they  are  predetermined. 
The  decision  problem  of  the  representative  firm  is  to  choose  a  time  path  of 
investment  and  employment  that  maximizes  V,  subject  to  the  inequalities 
mentioned  above  and  the  accumulation  equation: 
k=i-6k,  (2.1.4) 
with  6  symbolizing  the  rate  of  exponential  depreciation.  As  usual  dotted 
variables  indicate  time  derivatives. 
Applying  the  standard  solution  technique  of  the  maximum  principle  the 
following  necessary  conditions  for  an  optimum  are  obtained:2 
(2.1.5) 
(2.1.6) 
‘As  already  observed  by  Malinvaud  (1977),  firms  cannot  be  simultaneously  rationed  in  the 
goods  market  and  the  labour  market  unless  there  is  a  discrepancy  between  output  and  sales  and 
stockpiling  is  possible. 
*The  transversality  condition  is  as  usual:  lim,,,  P,&,  =O. 40  Th.  van  de  Klundert  and  P.  Peters,  Tax  incidence 
4=(r+6)q-[(1-zy)(l-Z,)--~]fk(krZ)-(1-~tj)  k  2h’  i  , 
0  0 
(2.1.7) 
together  with  the  Kuhn-Tucker  conditions: 
(2.1.8) 
The  symbol  q  stands  for  the  costate  variable  associated  with  the  accumu- 
lation  equation.  It  can  be  interpreted  as  the  shadow  price  of  capital.  As 
shown  by  Hayashi  (1982),  in  the  special  case  of  no  market  constraints  the 
shadow  price  is  equal  to  Tobin’s  q.  The  symbols  1,,&  and  &  are  familiar 
Lagrange  multipliers  associated  with  the  inequality  constraints. 
Under  Keynesian  Unemployment  (A, > 0, Ai  = 0, Al  = 0)  firms  are  rationed  in 
the  market  for  goods.  The  constraint  on  y  is  binding  and  output  equals 
y=y.  (2.1.9) 
The  corresponding  volume  of  employment  (Ik) then  follows  from 
Y  =S(k 4J.  (2.1.10) 
Under  Classical  Unemployment  (A, = 0, pi > 0, I, = 0)  employment  (Id)  follows 
from 
(2.1.11) 
The  corresponding  volume  of  output  is 
YS  =f(k,  0  (2.1.12) 
In  case  of  Repressed  Inflation  (A,,=O, li>  0,1,  > 0)  the  constraint  on  labour 
supply  is  binding  and  employment  is  equal  to 
1=1  (2.1.13) 
As  a  result,  output  is  then  constrained  to 
Y, =f(k  0  (2.1.14) Th.  van de  Klundert  and  P.  Peters,  Tax  incidence  41 
Investment  demand  follows  from  eqs.  (2.1.6)  and  (2.1.7).  Under  Classical 
Unemployment  and  Repressed  Inflation  investment  demand  determined  in 
this  way  is  notional  demand.  In  both  cases  all  buyers  are  rationed  in  the 
goods  market,  which  implies  that  actual  investment  equals  the  constraint: 
i= t(and  j=  7). Notional  investment  demand  depends  on  profitability,  as  can 
be  shown  by  integrating  eq.  (2.1.7)  for  A,=0  subject  to  the  transversality 
condition  given  in  footnote  2: 
qr=T  (l-r,)(l-~,)f~(k,Z)+(l-~~) 
0  (‘1 
f  ‘h’  ;  P”dv.  (2.1.15) 
Investment  demand  depends  on  4,  which  is  equal  to  the  present  value  of 
marginal  profits.  The  second  term  on  the  RHS  of  eq.  (2.1.15)  is  of  minor 
importance  since  it  shows  the  reduction  in  installation  costs  from  an  increase 
of  capital  with  one  unit.  The  first  term  on  the  RHS  represents  the  after-tax 
marginal  product  of  capital  in  the  usual  sense.  If  A,>  0,  we  must  have  A, =O. 
In  that  case  the  first  term  on  the  RHS  of  (2.1.15)  changes  into 
Under  Keynesian  Unemployment  marginal  profits  depend  on  the  possibility 
of  minimizing  production  costs  at  a  given  level  of  output.  For  instance,  if 
real  wages  rise  entrepreneurs  may  reduce  costs  by  increasing  the  capital 
intensity  of  production  [cf.  Blanchard  (1983),  Blanchard  and  Sachs  (1982), 
Malgrange  and  Villa  (1984)]. 
2.2.  The  behaviour  of households 
The  welfare  of  households  depends  on  consumption  of  goods  (c)  and  of 
leisure  and  on  the  amount  of  real  cash  balances  (M/P)  held.  Denoting  the 
maximum  available  time  by  1,  we  can  write  the  instantaneous  utility  function 
as 
.=,(,,,,.-0,:).  (2.2.1) 
It  will  be  assumed  subsequently  that  leisure  is  (weakly)  separable  from  goods 
and  real  cash  balances.3 
Households  take  as  given  the  time  paths  of  prices,  wage  rates,  real  interest 
rates  and  dividends  paid  by  firms.  There  may  be  a  constraint  on  the  amount 
‘See  Deaton  and  Muellbauer  (1980)  for  a  discussion  of  the  consequences  of  separability 42  Th.  van  de  Klundert  and  P.  Peters,  Tax  incidence 
of  goods  households  can  buy:  ciC,  or  the  amount  of  labour  actually 
supplied  may  have  an  upper  bound:  /ST  It  should  be  recalled  that  the  values 
of  endogenous  variables  at  which  constraints  become  binding  are  endo- 
genous  to  the  model.  The  value  of  the  constraint  on  labour  supply  is  indi- 
cated  by  a  double  bar  over  the  variable  1 to  mark  the  difference  with  the 
constraint  on  labour  demand  introduced  in  section  2.1. 
Given  a  constant  (utility)  rate  of  time  preference  (v)  the  decision  problem 
of  the  representative  household  is  to  choose  a  time  path  of  consumption, 
leisure  and  real  cash  balances  that  maximizes  the  present  value  of  utility: 
(2.2.2) 
subject  to  the  inequality  constraints  mentioned  above  and  the  dynamic 
budget  constraint: 
Ad+n+(l-z,)l$-  r+$ ;-c-g  ( I 
(2.2.3) 
where  A  stands  for  the  sum  of  interest  bearing  bonds  issued  by  firms  and 
non-interest  bearing  real  cash  balances,  and  7-r indicates  dividends  paid  by 
firms  to  households.  The  symbol  rI  represents  a  proportional  tax  rate  on 
labour  income,  whereas  T stands  for  the  amount  of  lump-sum  taxation. 
The  first  three  terms  on  the  RHS  of  eq.  (2.2.3)  give  the  income  flows,  i.e. 
real  interest  payments  received  by  households,  real  dividends  and  after-tax 
real  wages.  The  last  three  terms  relate  to  expenditures,  i.e.  the  opportunity 
cost  of  holding  money,  real  consumption  expenditures  and  real  lump-sum 
taxes  paid  by  households. 
It  does  not  matter  how  firms  are  financed  as  long  as  the  conditions  of  the 
Modigliani-Miller  theorem  hold.  Blanchard  and  Sachs  (1982)  assume  that  all 
investment  is  financed  from  retained  earnings,  but  that  firms  have  outstand- 
ing  (real)  debt.  Another  possibility  is  that  only  replacement  investment  is 
financed  out  of  retained  earnings  and  net  investment  by  issuing  bonds  [cf. 
Abel  and  Blanchard  (1983)].  In  all  possible  cases  the  resulting  dividend  is 
paid  out  to  households. 
Again  the  standard  solution  technique  can  be  applied  to  obtain  as 
necessary  conditions  for  an  optimum:4 
M 
u,  c,p  =x+A,,  ( > 
(2.2.4) 
+‘The transversality  condition  can,  in  this  case,  be  written  as:  lim,,,,  em”‘x,A,=O  [cf.  d’Autume 
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u(p)(1)  =(l -+-AI,  (2.2.5) 
(2.2.6) 
i=(v-r)x,  (2.2.7) 
together  with  the  Kuhn-Tucker  conditions: 
;i,(C-c)=O,  n,zo, 
(2.2.7) 
&(T-I)=o,  A,ZO. 
The  symbol  x  stands  for  the  costate  variable  associated  with  the  dynamic 
budget  constraint.  The  symbols  1,  and  1,  are  Lagrange  multipliers  associated 
with  the  inequality  constraints.  The  LHS  of  eqs.  (2.2.4),  (2.2.5)  and  (2.2.6) 
relate  respectively  to  the  marginal  utility  of  consumption,  the  marginal  utility 
of  leisure  and  the  marginal  utility  of  holding  real  cash  balances.  The 
specifications  take  account  of  the  assumed  separability  with  regard  to  leisure. 
Under  Keynesian  Unemployment  (A, = 0, A,,  > 0)  households  are  rationed  in 
the  labour  market.  The  constraint  on  labour  supply  is  binding  and  actual 
employment  is  given  by 
l=t:  (2.2.8) 
Demand  for  consumption  goods  (cd) then  follows  from 
M 
4 (  ) 
cd,-  =x. 
P 
(2.2.9) 
As  observed  by  Deaton  and  Muellbauer  (1980),  if  a  consumer  has  no  choice 
over  hours  worked  and  if  goods  are  weakly  separable  from  leisure  the 
spending  of  income  or  wealth  is  explicable  without  reference  to  the  number 
of  hours  actually  worked. 
Under  Classical  Unemployment  (2, > 0, Ah  > 0)  households  are  rationed  in 
the  market  for  goods  and  in  the  labour  market.  In  this  case  both  constraints 
are  binding: 
c=c,  l=i:  (2.2.10) 44  Th.  van  de  Klundevl  and  P.  Peters,  Tax  incidence 
In  the  case  of  Repressed  Inflation  (A, >O, A,,  = 0)  households  are  only 
rationed  in  the  goods  market: 
c = c.  (2.2.11) 
The  supply  of  labour  (1,) can  be  derived  from 
u(1,-l,(k)=U  -+.  (2.2.12) 
Eq.  (2.2.12)  can  also  be  used  to  determine  notional  supply  of  labour  in  the 
case  when  households  are  rationed  with  regard  to  hours  worked.  In  the  case 
of  rationing  in  the  goods  market,  notional  consumption  demand  follows  from 
eq.  (2.2.9).  Demand  for  real  cash  balances  is  governed  by  eq.  (2.2.6).  If 
consumers  are  rationed  they  need,  ceteris  paribus,  less  money  than  in  the 
case  of  unconstrained  demand. 
In  Walrasian  equilibrium  the  marginal  rate  of  substitution  between  real 
money  balances  and  consumption  equals  the  nominal  rate  of  interest 
(r + PIP),  whereas  the  marginal  rate  of  substitution  between  leisure 
and  consumption  equals  the  after-tax  real  wage  rate  (( 1 -  zJW/P). 
2.3.  Market  clearing 
In  the  preceding  subsections  we  analysed  the  behaviour  of  the  representa- 
tive  firm  and  the  representative  household.  We  now  tie  together  the  different 
pieces  by  considering  market  clearing  and  price  formation. 
Wages  and  prices  are  fixed  in  the  short  run.  Consequently,  at  each 
moment  the  short  side  of  the  market  determines  actual  output  and  actual 
employment.  The  constraints  on  demand  and  supply  introduced  in  subsec- 
tions  2.1  and  2.2  ought  to  be  explained  in  this  way.  If  sellers  (firms)  are 
constrained  in  the  market  for  goods,  total  demand  (y,=c,+  j,)  falls  short  of 
total  supply  (y,).  On  the  other  hand,  if  buyers  (households  and  firms)  are 
constrained  in  the  goods  market  total  supply  (Y,  or  y,)  falls  short  of  total 
demand  (yd).’  In  the  latter  case  there  are  two  possibilities.  Firms  may  be 
constrained  in  the  labour  market  (y,<  y,) or  there  may  be  no  binding 
constraint  on  the  demand  for  labour  (y,<y,).  Market  clearing  with  regard  to 
goods  can  now  be  summarized  by  the  following  equation  for  actual  output 
(y): 
5These  rationing  rules  imply  that  investment  demand  is  constrained  if  and  only  if  consump- 
tion  demand  is  constrained.  As  an  alternative  one  could  assume  that  investment  is  allowed  to  be 
carried  out  by  firms  as  in  Neary  and  Stiglitz  (1983).  In  this  case  there  would  also  be  a  regime  of 
Underconsumption  in  the  terminology  of  Muellbauer  and  Portes  (1978). Th.  van de  Klundert  and  P.  Peters,  Tax  incidence  45 
Y = min  Cydp  Y,, YJ.  (2.3.1) 
The  corresponding  equation  for  clearing  the  labour  market  is 
1= min  &,  l,, l,].  (2.3.2) 
Ignoring  borderline  cases  eqs.  (2.3.1)  and  (2.3.2)  give  rise  to  six  possible 
short-run  equilibria,  which  are  presented  in  table  1. 
Table  1 
Possible  regimes. 
Keynesian  Classical  Repressed 
Unemployment  Unemployment  Inflation 
(1) 
Yd<Y,<YI 
I, <  ld < I, 
(2) 
Yd<Yf<YS 
1,  <  I,  <  rd 
(3) 
YS<Yd<Yl 
1, < 1, <  r, 
(4) 
Ys<Y,<Yd 
[d  <  r.~ <  l, 
(5) 
Yf<Yd<Y, 
I, < 1, < I, 
(6) 
Yl<Y,<Yd 
I,  <  I,  <  I, 
Y=Yd 
l=l, 
Y=YS  Y=Yl 
l=l,  l=l, 
Prices  and  wages  react  to  excess  demand  (supply).  However,  as  observed 
by  Malinvaud  (1980),  the  definition  of  what  is  meant  by  excess  demand  or 
excess  supply  is  not  unambiguous  in  the  theory  of  fix-price  equilibria. 
Honkapohja  (1979)  relates  changes  in  nominal  prices  and  wages  to  the 
difference  between  the  ex-post  quantity  and  the  unsatisfied  demand  and 
supply.  This  suggestion  is  captured  by 
g=B,(Yd-  min  CY,,  YJ 
and 
W=  LL@in CL 41  -U 
(2.3.3) 
(2.3.4) 
where  /I,  and  /J,  are  parameters.  For  a  long-run  stationary  equilibrium  we 
must  have-P=  %=O.  .Combining  eqs.  (2.3.3)  and  (2.3.4)  with  the  possibilities 
presented  in  table  1,  it  appears  that  the  stationary  equilibrium  will  be 
Walrasian  (y=y,=y,=y,  and  1= Z,=l,=  1,)  in  cases  (l),  (3),  (4)  and  (6).  In 
cases  (2)  and  (5)  the  long-run  solution  is  characterized  by  y=y,  =y,  <y,  and 
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The  long-run  solution  for  cases  (2)  and  (5)  is  illustrated  in  fig.  1. The  upper 
part  shows  the  production  function  for  a  given  capital  stock.  In  the  lower 
part  of  the  figure  notional  labour  demand  and  supply  are  shown.  The  long- 
run  equilibrium  points  are  indicated  by  A (y = y, = yr) [resp.  A (1=  I, = /,)I.  The 
resulting  real  wage  rate  (W/P)*  is  not  a  market  clearing  rate.  There  is  still  a 
possibility  of  mutual  advantageous  trade.  In  the  present  model  it  seems 
natural  to  assume  that  agents  will  exploit  this  potential.  For  that  reason  eq. 
(2.3.4)  will  be  changed  into 
(2.3.5) 
labour  supply 
Fig.  1 
Eqs.  (2.3.3)  and  (2.3.5)  taken  together  guarantee  that  in  the  long  run  the 
economy  exhibits  a  Walrasian  equilibrium.  In  the  short  run,  it  may  be 
possible  that  the  nominal  wage  rate  rises  despite  (Keynesian)  unemployment. 
This  case  is  illustrated  in  subsection  3.3  below.  In  such  a  situation  firms 
know  that  unemployment  will  not  last  for  ever  and  that  they  have  to 
compete  for  labour  now  in  order  to  exploit  profitable  opportunities  later  on. Th.  van de  Klundert  and  P.  Peters.  Tax  incidence  47 
In  this  sense  wage  formation  is  linked  to  perfect  foresight.  The  assumption 
that  wages  and  prices  are  not  fully  flexible  is  maintained,  because  there  are  a 
a  number  of  good  reasons  for  price  inertia,  as  discussed  for  instance  in 
Nadiri  (1983). 
3.  Tax  incidence 
The  incidence  of  several  tax  instruments  will  be  analysed  assuming  equal 
yields  in  the  final,  Walrasian  steady  state.  Tariffs  in  subsections  3.1-3.4  are 
based  on  a  yield  of  5  percent  in  terms  of  initial  GNP.  In  these  cases  the 
proceeds  of  the  tax  will  be  redistributed  back  to  individuals  by  means  of 
lump-sum  payments.  In  subsection  3.5  changes  between  taxes  other  than 
lump-sum  will  be  briefly  considered. 
3.1.  A  sales  tax 
The  effect  of  a  5.3  percent  balanced  budget  tax  increase  on  sales  (zY= 
0.52891  and  zYy=  T/P)  is  presented  in  table  2.  Variables  are  measured  as 
percentage  deviations  from  the  initial  steady  state  path.  The  last  column 
relates  to  the  new  steady  state  (SS). 
If  the  savings  behaviour  in  the  economy  can  be  described  in  terms  of  an 
infinitely-lived  representative  household,  then  in  the  long  run  the  after-tax 
rate  of  return  on  capital  does  not  depend  on  the  tax  rate  [cf.  Atkinson  and 
Stiglitz  (1980)  Abel  and  Blanchard  (1983)].  The  relevant  equation  for  the 
long  run  is: 
(3.1.1) 
To  restore  the  after-tax  rate  of  return  the  capital  stock  must  fall,  but  the  new 
long-run  equilibrium  of  capital  cannot  be  derived  from  eq.  (3.1.1).  In  our 
model  the  supply  of  labour  is  endogenous.  Therefore  the  long-run  results 
depend  on  the  amount  of  leisure  households  take.  As  appears  from  table  2, 
leisure  increases.  This  is  the  result  of  opposing  forces.  The  decline  of  the 
capital  stock  induces  a  negative  (wealth)  effect.  The  fall  in  the  real  wage  leads 
to  a  higher  demand  for  leisure.  As  shown  by  Atkinson  and  Stiglitz  (1980),  the 
labour  supply  curve  slopes  upward  if  the  utility  function  is  logarithmic  (as 
assumed  in  the  appendix)  and  households  have  positive  non-labour  income 
besides  their  wage  income.  On  balance  the  effect  of  the  decline  in  real  wages 
dominates  and  labour  supply  diminishes. 
The  fall  in  real  wages  can  be  explained  by  a  decline  in  the  demand  for 
labour.  A  lower  level  of  the  capital  stock  leads  to  less  employment.  In  order 
to  restore  full  employment  the  real  wage  rate  must  decline  substantially.  As  a 
consequence  the  sales  tax  is  shifted  from  capital  to  labour. 48  Th.  ~‘an de  Klundert  and  P.  Peters,  Tax  incidence 
Table  2 
A  sales  tax. 











-7.38  -4.16  -1.51 
-  2.02  -3.25  -2.91 
0.00  -  1.33  -  3.96 
0.00  -  0.06  0.95 
0.00  -1.55  -  4.60 
-0.40  -  2.70  -  7.61 
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~  16.60 
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-  1.73 
-  2.03  -  3.09 
-8.16  -  7.80 
-9.31  -  8.44 
-  3.88  -  4.45 
-3.78  -2.95 
-0.01  -  0.00 
-0.77  -0.19  -  0.02  0.00 
-0.41  3.37  4.66  4.82 
-5.50  -  7.34  -  7.93  -8.00 
2.27  4.13  4.74  4.82 
-6.10  -  7.63  -  8.09  -8.15 
10.49  -  13.95  ~  15.07  ~  14.77 
CLU  CLU 
-0.51  -3.50  -4.48  -  4.60 
-7.14  ~  7.14  -7.97  -8.00 
-  7.60  ~ 7.85  -7.98  -8.00 
-2.31  -  4.61  -5.31  -  5.46 
-  4.45  -5.19  -5.43  -  5.46 
-3.99  -  5.08  -  5.42  -  5.46 
2.49  -0.54  -1.58  -1.71 
-2.95  ~  2.03  -  1.75  -1.71 
-  1.81  ~  1.75  ~  1.72  -1.71 
-4.20  -4.56  -4.60 
~  7.92  -7.99  -  8.00 
-  8.08  -8.01  -  8.00 
-5.19  ~  5.43  -  5.46 
-  2.03  -  1.75  -  1.71 
-  0.00  ~ 0.00  0.00 
25  50  ss 
Cl.U.  c1.u. 
In  our  numerical  example  the  substitution  effect  dominates  the  wealth 
effect  with  regard  to  leisure  in  the  long  run.  Therefore,  the  supply  of  labour 
decreases.  This  result  reinforces  the  downward  movement  of  the  capital 
stock. 
In  the  short  run  (t  =O)  notional  investment  demand  decreases  substan- 
tially.  The  sequence  of  marginal  profits  declines  as  a  result  of  the  tax.  This  is 
reflected  in  the  downward  jump  of  the  non-predetermined  variable  4.  Despite 
a  loss  of  wealth  in  the  long  run  anticipated  by  households,  notional 
consumption  demand  increases.  This  can  be  explained  by  the  fact  that 
households  anticipate  also  the  rationing  in  the  market  for  goods,  which 
already  appears  at  t=  1. As  shown  by  d’Autume  and  Michel  (1985),  there  will 
be  no  anticipatory  buying  of  investment  goods.  On  the  contrary,  investors 
will  buy  less  today  if  they  anticipate  future  constraints  on  the  quantity  of 
goods  they  can  buy. 
The  fall  in  investment  demand  leads  to  a  situation  of  Keynesian  Unem- 
ployment  (K.U.)  at  t=O. It  should  be  remarked  that  a  tax  on  sales  has  an 
important  impact  on  after-tax  real  labour  costs,  which  induces  substitution  of 
labour  for  capital.  As  a  result  notional  labour  demand  (Id)  and  notional 
supply  of  goods  (y,)  decrease  from  the  very  beginning.  As  soon  as  notional Th.  van de  Klundert  and P.  Peters,  Tax  incidence  49 
demand  for  goods  (yd)  recovers  there  results  a  situation  of  excess  demand.  In 
fact  from  t=  1  until  the  new  long-run  equilibrium  is  approached  asymptoti- 
cally  the  regime  of  Classical  Unemployment  (C1.U.)  prevails. 
It  can  be  concluded  that  in  case  of  short-run  price  rigidity  a  sales  tax  is 
shifted  to  wages  in  the  long  run,  but  that  the  adjustment  process  is  charac- 
terized  by  (mainly  classical)  unemployment.  In  the  long  run,  lifetime  utility 
of  the  representative  agent  (U)  decreases  by  14.8  percent. 
3.2.  A  profit  tax 
The  results  of  a  balanced-budget  tax  on  profits  of  about  9  percent  (zZ= 
0.089241  and  z,[y-  /(W/P)]  =  T/P)  are  presented  in  table  3.  As  appears 
from  formula  (3.1.1),  the  long-run  effect  on  the  after-tax  rate  of  return  is 
larger  than  in  the  case  of  a  sales  tax.  As  a  consequence  the  capitalllabour 
ratio  decreases  more  in  the  present  case  of  tax  on  profits.  The  change  in  the 
long-run  supply  of  labour  is  not  much  different,  as  a  comparison  of  tables  2 
and  3  shows.  An  equal  yield  tax  on  profits  therefore  leads  to  a  lower  level  of 
capital  in  the  long  run. 
The  decline  in  labour  supply  is  again  the  result  of  opposing  forces.  The 
accumulation  effect  with  regard  to  leisure  is  positive,  whereas  the  real-wage 
effect  has  a  negative  sign.  Both  effects  are  now  stronger,  but  the  real-wage 
effect  still  dominates. 
The  adjustment  process  shows  a  picture  similar  to  that  of  table  2.  If  a 
profit  tax  is  imposed,  the  regime  of  Keynesian  Unemployment  lasts  some- 
what  longer.  But  as  capital  decumulates  a  switch  towards  the  regime  of 
Classical  Unemployment  becomes  unavoidable,  despite  a  decline  of  real 
wages.  As  a  matter  of  fact  the  switch  is  realized  at  t = 2. 
It  should  be  observed  that  Keynesian  Unemployment  is  caused  by  .a 
substantial  fall  in  notional  investment  demand.  In  contrast  with  this,  notional 
consumption  demand  is  even  higher  than  in  the  case  of  a  sales  tax. 
Anticipatory  buying  of  consumption  goods  is  higher  because  future  rationing 
is  more  stringent.  The  notional  supply  of  goods  decreases  strongly  as  the 
stock  of capital  falls  towards  its  new  long-run  equilibrium  value. 
The  explanation  of  results  is  complicated  not  only  because  of  the  usual 
circular  causation  problems  but  also  because  of  ‘bootstraps  phenomena’,  as 
they  are  called  by  Neary  and  Stiglitz  (1983).  The  bootstraps  phenomenon 
implies  that  the  prevalence  of  a  certain  regime  today  is  more  likely  if  it  is 
expected  to  prevail  tomorrow.  The  switch  towards  Classical  Unemployment 
at  t =2  can  be  explained,  among  other  things,  by  the  fact  that  agents  expect 
this  regime  to  prevail  in  the  future. 
The  nominal  wage  rate  decreases  more  in  the  case  of  a  sales  tax.  The 
reason  is  that  in  our  specification  of  the  model  the  nominal  wage  rate 
changes  under  the  influence  of  notional  excess  demand  (supply)  instead  of 50  T/I.  van  de  Klundert  and  P.  Peters,  Tax  incidence 
Table  3 
A  profit  tax. 
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-1.13 
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6.81  6.96 
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c1.u.  CLU.  c1.u.  au. 
actual  unemployment.  However,  the  real  wage  rate  declines  more  in  case  of  a 
profit  tax,  because  labour  becomes  relatively  more  abundant  compared  with 
the  example  of  a  sales  tax. 
A  profit  tax  with  the  same  yield  as  a  sales  tax  puts  a  heavier  burden  upon 
the  economy.  This  is  reflected  in  the  long-run  value  of  the  lifetime  utility  of 
the  representative  individual,  which  falls  by  23  percent. 
3.3.  An  investment  tax 
A  tax  on  investment  expenditure  with  equal  yield  has  rather  dramatic 
effects,  as  shown  in  table  4.  Such  a  tax  can  be  conceived  as  an  investment  tax 
credit  with  the  sign  reversed.  In  order  to  realize  the  same  yield,  the  tariff  has 
to  be  rather  high  (zj=  -0.28655  and  rjj=  T/P). 
There  is  no  need  to  discuss  the  outcomes  at  length.  The  results  are 
qualitatively  equivalent  to  those  in  the  case  of  a  tax  on  profits.  The  only 
difference  is  that  all  figures  are  blown  up.  Again  the  drain  on  investment 
results  in  Keynesian  Unemployment  at  the  beginning,  but  the  regime  of 
Classical  Unemployment  takes  over  at  t = 2.  Ultimately  the  investment  tax  is 
shifted  to  labour  and  real  wages  decline  substantially. Th.  oan  de  Klundert  and  P.  Peters,  Tax  incidence  51 
Table  4 
An investment tax. 
t  0  1  5  10  25  50  ss 
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Yd  -  15.88  -8.82 
Y,  0.00  -  5.30 
YI  -  0.47  -4.13 
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8.81  0.44  -  12.91  -  18.05  -  18.97 
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-1.03  -6.83  -  17.27  -21.37  -22.11 
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r  -  -31.06  15.88  - - 13.10  8.82  -  -  13.35  10.18  - - 16.69  9.44  - -6.10  20.43 
r  0.04  0.06  -  0.02  -0.02  -  0.01 
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-31.21  -31.33 
-31.31  -31.33 
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-4.58  -4.31 
-0.00  0.00 
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k  0.00  -5.46  -  15.51  -21.24  -28.33  -  30.88  -31.33 
P  0.00  -0.93  2.28  8.29  18.33  22.61  23.40 
W  0.00  -  1.38  -4.82  -8.35  -  15.03 
lJ  -  10.44  -  17.09  -37.71  -  50.34  -  67.59 
Regime  K.U.  K.U.  c1.u.  c1.u.  c1.u. 
-  17.75  -  18.23 
-74.51  -  72.69 
CIU. 
There  are  two  points  that  deserve  further  comment.  First,  one  would 
perhaps  expect  that  long-run  labour  supply  would  be  in  line  with  the  results 
in  tables  2  and  3.  Instead,  there  is  a  greater  decrease  in  the  case  of  an 
investment  tax.  This  is  caused  by  a  more  than  proportional  decline  in  the 
real  wage  rate  compared  with  the  decline  in  real  wealth.  The  fall  in  real 
wages  depends  upon  the  value  of  the  elasticity  of  factor  substitution,  which 
amounts  to  0.5  in  our  simulation  runs.  Second,  the  long-run  value  of  the 
shadow  price  q increases  by  28.65  percent,  which  is  exactly  equal  to  the  tariff 
imposed.  This  result  follows  immediately  from  eq.  (2.1.6).  For  values  of  q 
lower  than  the  long-run  solution  investment  is  depressed. 
It  should  be  stressed  that  adjustment  paths  are  not  symmetrical  if  the 
impulse  is  reversed.  In  the  perhaps  more  relevant  case  of  an  investment  tax 
credit  the  regime  of  Repressed  Inflation  prevails  for  some  time,  because 
investment  is  boosted  by  the  tax  credit.  Afterwards  there  is  a  switch  to 
Keynesian  Unemployment  as  capital  accumulation  induces  excess  supply  of 
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3.4.  A  wage  tax 
The  effect  of  a  compensated  wage  tax  with  equal  yield  [z,=O.121953  and 
zJ(W/P)  =  T/P]  is  presented  in  table  5.  Households  are  compensated  for  the 
loss  of  income  by  a  lump-sum  rebate.  As  appears  from  the  long-run  results, 
there  is  no  possibility  of  shifting  the  burden  of  the  tax.  The  demand  for 
labour  being  infinitely  elastic  in  the  long  run  the  full  impact  is  on  disposable 
real  wages.  The  decline  in  after-tax  real  wages  induces  a  fall  in  labour  supply. 
Since  the  rate  of  return  on  capital  does  not  change,  the  stock  of  capital  must 
decline  at  the  same  rate  as  labour  input.  Consequently,  all  volume  variables 
decrease  by  the  same  percentage. 
Table  5 
A  wage  tax. 
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In  the  short  run  (t = 0),  there  is  a  somewhat  larger  impact  on  labour  supply 
compared  with  the  long-run  result.  The  corresponding  fall  in  output  leads  to 
excess  demand  for  goods.  The  regime  of  Repressed  Inflation  prevails.  The 
excess  demand  for  goods  is  reinforced  by  anticipatory  buying  by  consumers. 
Along  with  this  households  take  more  leisure  (and  supply  less  labour), 
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variable  x.  It  appears  that  there  are  bootstraps  effects  all  around.  The  only 
force  in  the  opposite  direction  is  the  decline  in  notional  investment  demand, 
caused  by  the  fall  in  the  marginal  productivity  of  capital.  As  the  supply  of 
labour  diminishes,  capital  becomes  more  abundant. 
The  situation  of  Repressed  Inflation  lasts  for  some  time,  but  at  t=6  there 
is  a  shift  to  Classical  Unemployment.  This  is  due  to  a  substantial  decline  in 
notional  labour  demand  (Id)  caused  by  two  factors.  First,  as  the  stock  of 
capital  falls  less  labour  is  needed.  Secondly,  higher  real  wages  induce  a 
change  towards  more  capital-intensive  techniques  of  production.  The  regime 
of  Classical  Unemployment  prevails  until  a  new  equilibrium  is  attained 
asymptotically. 
In  the  long  run  a  wage  tax  falls  entirely  on  labour.  Disposable  real  labour 
income  declines  pari  passu  with  the  change  in  the  tariff.  However,  in  the  case 
of  a  tax  on  wages,  welfare  is  the  least  affected.  Lifetime  utility  of  the 
representative  individual  decreases  by  only  4.4  percent  in  the  long  run. 
3.5.  Changes  between  taxes 
If  yields  are  equal,  taxes  may  be  changed.  The  possible  implications  of 
such  changes  can  be  illustrated  by  giving  an  example.  Table  6  reports  the 
results  with  regard  to  the  regimes  prevailing  in  the  case  when  a  sales  tax  is 
changed  in  favour  of  a  tax  on  wages  (7, +zJ  and  also  for  the  opposite  case  of 
substituting  a  tax  on  wages  for  a  tax  on  sales  (z~+z,).  Both  exercises  show 
the  result  of  a  combined  impulse:  one  tax  is  abolished  and  the  other  is 
imposed  at  t =O. 
In  the  first  mentioned  case  investment  demand  increases  and  labour  supply 
decreases,  which  results  in  excess  demand  for  goods  and  labour  (Repressed 
Inflation).  Under  Repressed  Inflation  prices  and  wages  rise.  As  real  cash 
balances  decline  consumption  demand  decreases  and  there  is  a  switch  to 
Keynesian  Unemployment  at  t = 4.  In  this  respect  the  situation  differs  from 
that  in  table  5,  where  the  switch  is  towards  Classical  Unemployment.  The 
difference  is  caused  by  the  role  of  investment  and  capital  accumulation.  If  a 
tax  on  wages  is  imposed,  the  stock  of  capital  falls.  If  at  the  same  time  a  sales 
tax  is  abolished,  profits  go  up  and  capital  is  accumulated.  Therefore  the 
supply  of  goods  increases  in  the  latter  case. 
If  a  sales  tax  is  imposed  instead  of  a  tax  on  wages,  the  results  are  less 
spectacular.  There  is  a  close  resemblance  to  the  results  presented  in  table  2. 
There  is  Keynesian  Unemployment  in  the  short  run,  but  after  a  while  there  is 
a  switch  to  Classical  Unemployment.  A  comparison  of  both  cases  shows  that 
in  the  case  of  a  tax  change  the  supply  of  goods  falls  at  a  lower  rate.  This  can 
be  explained  by  the  fact  that  labour  supply  increases  if  the  tax  on  wages  is 
reduced. 
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Table  6 
Changes  between  a  sales  tax  and  a  tax  on  wages. 
Change 
t  0  1  5  10  0  1  5  10 
Yd  6.16  2.82  0.17  0.39  -4.31  -2.55  -0.90  -  1.55 
YS  1.81  1.79  1.21  1.07  -  1.99  -2.31  -  2.60  -  2.79 
Yl  -  1.59  -0.56  0.61  0.92  1.03  0.07  -  1.70  -  2.44 
Regime  R.I.  R.I.  K.U.  K.U.  K.U.  K.U.  c1.u.  c1.u 
expected.  Output  increases  by  3.45  percent  in  the  first  case  (sY+zJ  and 
decreases  by  3.34  percent  in  the  second  case  (zr+zJ. 
4.  Epilogue 
Building  on  a  seminal  article  by  Blanchard  and  Sachs  (1982)  this  paper 
takes  a  further  step  towards  the  integration  of  microeconomics  and  macro- 
economics.  Although  the  emphasis  lies  on  an  analysis  of  tax  incidence,  there 
are  several  other  features  that  deserve  attention. 
First,  the  regime  of  Repressed  Inflation  must  be  taken  into  account  if 
shocks  in  different  directions  are  allowed  for.  In  fact,  it  is  a  logical 
consequence  of  assuming  that  households  want  to  supply  certain  amounts  of 
labour  in  every  period  of  time.  Secondly,  there  is  a  need  for  a  theory  of  price 
inertia  that  tits  well  into  the  concept  of  rational  decision-making.  Without 
such  a  theory  price  formation  remains  somewhat  ambiguous,  as  we  have 
indicated.  Thirdly,  models  of  the  scope  and  size  tackled  in  this  paper  must  be 
solved  numerically.  This  may  be  considered  a  disadvantage.  On  the  other 
hand,  as  our  numerical  experiments  show,  there  are  certain  tendencies  that 
come  to  the  foreground  quite  clearly.  The  bootstraps  phenomenon  discussed 
above  is  an  excellent  example. 
Appendix:  Specification  of  the  model 
For  the  production  function  we  maintain  the  CES  specification  proposed 
by  Blanchard  and  Sachs  (1982): 
The  elasticity  of  substitution  is  then  rrl =  l/(1  +pl).  Installation  costs  are  a 
linear  function  of  the  ratio  of  investment  over  the  stock  of  capital: 
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The  utility  function  is  of  the  following  form: 
The  (partial)  elasticity  of  substitution  between  consumption  and  real  cash 
balances  is  c2 =  l/( 1  + pJ.  There  is  a  positive  relationship  between  real  cash 
balances  and  the  marginal  utility  of  consumption.  An  increase  in  prices 
reduces,  ceteris  paribus,  real  cash  balances  and  therefore  also  the  marginal 
utility  of  consumption.  To  restore  the  old  situation,  consumption  must  rise. 
The  specification  of  the  utility  function  in  this  way  implies  that  the  price 
system  has  a  direct  stabilizing  effect  on  the  economy.  The  term  for  leisure  is 
added  in  an  additively  separable  way.  The  model  is  recursive,  which 
facilitates  computation  to  a  large  extent. 
We  are  now  in  a  position  to  present  the  complete  model  as  it  is  applied  in 
numerical  exercises.  The  transversality  conditions  are  not  repeated  here, 
because  they  are  applied  in  an  indirect  manner  in  two-point  boundary  value 
problems: 
1,:  ld={l/C(([P(l-cC)(l  -z,)y]/W)P”(‘+P”-(l-a)/a)l’P’k  (A4 
y,:  y,=y[ak-P’+(l--)ZdP1]~l’pl,  (A.2) 
i,:  i,=([q/(l  -zj)-  l]k)/2b,  (A.3) 
j,:  j,  = id( 1 + bid/k),  64.4) 
cd:  (5ca(l+P2))/[5c;PZ+(1-5)(M/P)~PZ]=x,  (A.5) 
y,:  y,=y[crk-P’+(l-a)E;P’]~“P’, 






1:  1= min  [ld, Z,, 1,],  (A.ll) 
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j:j=k(1-4(Y,-Y), 
i:  i = [( -  1 + J(  1 + 4b j/k))/2b]  k, 
r:  C(f -MM/P)-  ‘+~~]/[S’C~~~+(l-~)(M/P)-~~]=x(r+P/P), 
Ids: 1,, = min  [ld, 1,], 
T:  i+rjj=Tyy+T 
k:  k=i-hk,  (A.18) 
x:  z2=(v-r)x,  (A.19) 
q:  4=(r+6)q-(1-z,)(l--zy)Y[ak~P1+(1-Cl)ldsP1]~(1+p1)iP* 
x l~(l+%(l/k)(l  +pl)-(l  -z,)b(i/k)“,  (A.20) 
p:  PIP=p,Cyd-min(y,,yl)l, 








The  equations  are  explained  in  the  text.  Two  additional  observations  are  to 
be  made.  First,  where  Blanchard  and  Sachs  (1982)  replace  minimum  func- 
tions  by’s  CES  function  with  very  low  elasticity  we  apply  the  minimum  rule 
exactly.  This  facilitates  the  interpretation  of  the  simulation  results.  Secondly, 
eq.  (A.20)  captures  all  possibilities  in  a  single  relationship.  The  second  term 
on  the  RHS  of  eq.  (A.20)  is  derived  from  eqs.  (2.1.5)  and  (2.1.7).  Under 
Keynesian  Unemployment  (2, > 0, I,, = 0)  this  term  can  be  written  as: 
Notional  labour  demand  (Id) then  follows  from: 
(1 -~,).m,  4) =;. Th.  van de  Klundert  and  P.  Peters,  Tax  incidence 
Substitution  of  the  latter  expression  in  the  former  expression  results  in 
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(a) 
with  1= 1, in  the  present  case.  Under  Classical  Unemployment  (II,=O,L,=O) 
the  second  term  on  the  RHS  of  (A.20)  should  be  equal  to: 
(1 -r&l  -ry)fk(k,  I)> 
with  1= 1,. Therefore,  we  may  write 
(‘4 
Under  Repressed  Inflation  (A, =O,  1,,  >O)  applying  the  same  procedure  as  in 
the  former  case  gives 
with  l=l,.  Combination  of (a),  (b)  and  (c)  leads  to 
where  Ids=min  [ld, I,]. 
There  is,  however,  a  minor  problem  in  the  case  of  Keynesian  Unemploy- 
ment  if  at  the  same  time  1,  < 1,  < 1,. In  this  situation  the  opportunity  costs  of 
labour  used  in  eq.  (A.20)  exceed  the  real  wage  rate. 
Endogenous  variables: 
c  = actual  consumption 
cd = notional  consumption  demand 
i  = actual  investment 
i,  = notional  investment  demand 
j  = total  investment  spending 
j,  = notional  total  investment  spending 
k  =real  capital  stock 
1 = employment 
1, =notional  labour  demand 
I,  = Keynesian  labour  demand 58  Th.  ~‘an de  Klundert  and  P.  Peters,  Tax  incidence 
1, =notional  labour  supply 
P  = nominal  price  level 
q  =shadow  price  of  investment  goods 
Y =real  interest  rate 
W=nominal  wage  rate 
x  =shadow  price  of  consumption  goods 
y  =real  production 
y,=notional  demand  for  goods 
y, = labour  constrained  supply  of  goods 
y, =notional  supply  of  goods 
Calibration  of  the  model  is  to  a  large  extent  based  on  the  parameter  values 
presented  in  Blanchard  and  Sachs  (1982).  Parameter  values  are  chosen  to  be 
acceptable  compared  with  the  results  of  empirical  studies.  In  addition,  the  set 
of  parameter  values  should  generate  a  reasonable  initial  situation.  The 
parameter  values  used  in  the  simulations  are  given  below: 
a  =0.9 
u  =0.25 
b  =4.0 
/$)=O.l 
fi$$=  0.05 
6  =O.l  M=  0.25 
& =l  v  =O.lO 
4  =0.09946  pi=  1 
y  =0.23717  p2=6 
I,  = 9.0  5  =0.95 
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